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The unreliability of eyewitness testimony' is inconsistent with
the criminal justice system's reliance upon it. Many dangers arise
from inaccurate identification evidence; the most serious is that a
conviction based on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage
ofjustice.2 The Supreme Court noted in United States v. Wade3 that
"[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the an-
nals, of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identifica-
I See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (eyewit-
ness identification notoriously unreliable); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392, 635 P.2d
1236, 1241 (1981) (cases of mistaken identificiation are not infrequent and the problem
of misidentification has not been alleviated). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 228 n.6 (1967). For extensive research in this area see E. Lomrus, EYEwrrNEss
TESTIMONY (1979); P. WALL, EYEwrrNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); A.
YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEwrrNESs TESTIMONY (1979). See also generally Brigham,
The Accuracy of Eyewitness Evidence: How do Attorneys See It?, 55 FLA. B.J. 714 (1981); Brig-
ham & Bothwell, Ability of PerspectiveJurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications,
7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. AM. 23 (1974);
Convis, Testifying About Testimony: Psychological Evidence on Perceptual and Memory Factors
Affecting the Credibility of Testimony, 21 Dug. L. REV. 579 (1983); Loftus, The Eyewitness on
Trial, 16 TRIAL 31 (1980); Loftus & Fishman, Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, 4 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY Rev. 87 (1978); Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, Accuracy,
Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identifications, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440
(1979); Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliabil-
ity of Eyewitness Identifications, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977).
2 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). See also McGowan, Constitutional
Interpretation and CriminalIdentification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235 (1970) ("The vagaries
of visual identification evidence have traditionally been of great concern to those in-
volved in the administration of criminal law. It has been thought by many experts to
present what is conceivably the greatest single threat to the achievement of our ideal
that no innocent man shall be punished." Id. at 238).
3 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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tion. ' ' 4 Injustices resulting from unreliable eyewitness testimony
also harm those working in the criminal justice system and society as
a whole.5
Although the dangers of eyewitness testimony are well docu-
mented, 6 the need for eyewitness identification testimony guaran-
tees its continued legal acceptance. For example, eyewitness
identifications in criminal prosecutions can lend certainty in cases
that might otherwise depend upon weak circumstantial evidence. 7
Common sense tells us that witnesses do, on many occasions, cor-
rectly identify individuals. The importance and acceptance of eye-
witness testimony, despite its shortcomings, is illustrated under the
"one-witness" rule. "This rule, adhered to by a majority ofjurisdic-
tions in the United States, sustains a conviction upon the uncorrob-
orated identification testimony of a single eyewitness."
8
The United States Supreme Court, in recognition of the
problems associated with the legal system's dependence upon eye-
witness testimony, has attempted to identify and reduce causes of
unreliable eyewitness testimony.9 The Court's major concern has
been to develop legal standards and remedies that would substan-
tially reduce erroneous misidentification.10
Recently, however, psychologists have argued that the
problems of eyewitness testimony have not been sufficiently con-
trolled by courts or understood by jurors.11 Reforms suggested to
mitigate these problems include the admission of expert psychologi-
cal testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.1 2 This
suggested reform is the subject of this Comment.
4 Id. at 228.
5 Such miscarriages of justice are disastrous not only for defendants but also for
those working in the criminal justice system, such as, for example, police, attorneys, and
judges, who have invested a great deal of time and effort in an unproductive or ineffi-
cient direction. See Brigham, supra note 1, at 714.
6 See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932). Borchard described the
erroneous criminal prosecution and conviction of 65 persons in 27 different states. See
also Convis, supra note 1, at 585-87.
7 See Purcell, Manson v. Brathwaite: Lookingfor the Silver Lining in the Area of Eyewitness
Identifications, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1079 (1978).
8 Comment, Eyewitness Testimony and the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal
Cases, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1387, 1391-92 (1982). See generally 7 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2034, at 343 (Chadbourne Rev. 1979). See also United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552,
554 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Corroboration is required, however, for particular crimes, notably
"sex" offenses, in which the urge to fantasize or motive to fabricate increases the risk of
unjust conviction).
9 See infra notes 23-52 and accompanying text.
10 See Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade to
Kirby, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 1079 (1973).
11 See generally E. LoFTus, supra note 1; Buckhout, supra note 1; Convis, supra note 1.
12 See infra notes 183-238 and accompanying text.
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Whether psychological experts should be permitted to testify
on factors affecting eyewitness testimony is unresolved. The tradi-
tional rule has been to exclude psychological testimony regarding
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.' 3 The Arizona Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion, however, in its January 11,
1983 decision in State v. Chapple,14 and many criminal trial juries
have been permitted to hear testimony from psychological experts
in recent years. 15
This Comment divides into four sections the examination of ex-
pert testimony on eyewitness identification. Section II will consider
the present judicial protections governing the admission of eyewit-
ness testimony. Section III will focus on the substance of the pro-
posed psychological testimony and the current case law supporting
and rejecting expert psychological testimony. In Section IV the
question of whether expert psychological testimony should be ad-
mitted will be addressed and the unprecedented decision of State v.
Chapple16 will be analyzed. Finally, Section V will conclude that
while the integration of psychological research into the legal system
is valuable and necessary, eyewitness testimony is not a proper sub-
ject for expert testimony.
This conclusion is based on several premises. First, expert psy-
chological testimony does not meet the present standards governing
the admission of expert testimony. Second, additional research is
needed before this reform is considered. Finally, unrecognized dan-
gers associated with expert psychological testimony make this solu-
tion as potentially unjust as unreliable eyewitness testimony.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, -1054 (10th Cir. 1976); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832
(D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547
(Minn. 1980).
This Comment will henceforth use the phrase "expert psychological testimony" as a
shortened version of "expert psychological testimony about eyewitness testimony." The
above phrase will refer only to expert testimony about eyewitnesses and not to other
types of expert psychological testimony.
14 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
15 Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus has been permitted to testify in over 90 trials. Tele-
phone interview with Elizabeth F. Loftus, a professor of psychology at the University of
Washington and author of EyEwrrNEss TESTIMONY, supra note 1 (Jan. 20, 1984). See also
State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980) (there are trial courts around
the country that, in criminal cases, have admitted testimony of experts on the subject of
eyewitness testimony). For a list of cases in which Psychologist Dr. Robert Buckhout has
testified, see Buckhout, Nobody Likes a Smartass: Expert Testimony by Psychologists, 3 Soc.
ACTION & LAw 39, 43 n.13 (1976).
16 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
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II. SUPREME COURT EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE UNRELIABILITY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Traditionally, the public and the courts have not questioned the
reliability of eyewitness testimony. Courts once ruled that all eye-
witness identifications would be admissible at trial and allowed the
defense to attack only the weight of the evidence. 17 Recently, how-
ever, research has indicated that the accuracy of eyewitness identifi-
cation is questionable; as a result, courts now treat eyewitness
testimony more cautiously. Under present law, eyewitness testi-
mony is admissible provided that its reliability outweighs "the cor-
rupting effect of the suggestive identification itself."',,
One factor affecting the reliability of eyewitness testimony is the
nature of pre-trial identification procedures. 19 The identification
process used in the criminal justice system typically begins with a
witness' description of the suspect. 20 Once a suspect is arrested and
charged with a crime, the witness is asked to make either an in-per-
son or a photo identification. During an in-person identification the
witness may be asked to recognize the suspect from either a
showup-the presentation of the suspect alone to the witness, or a
lineup-the presentation to the witness of several people, including
the suspect. 21
Inherent in the identification process is a potential for injustice
and mistaken identification. 22 In United States v. Wade,23 the Su-
preme Court noted some of the dangers associated with identifica-
tion procedures: (1) the manner in which the prosecution presents
the suspect to witnesses for pre-trial identification may be overly
suggestive;24 (2) once a witness has picked out the accused at the
17 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1967); see also Comment, supra note 8,
at 1400 n.60 ("In general, courts view the post-admission problem as one of the weight
and credibility to be assigned to the identification testimony. This is traditionally a func-
tion within the province of the jury, and courts, as a result, are reluctant to usurp any of
the jury's functions.").
18 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1976).
19 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967) [" ' t]he influence of im-
proper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages
ofjustice than any other single factor....' "Id. (quoting P. WALL, EYE-WImESS IDEN-
TIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965)). See also Starkman, The Use of Eyewitness Identifi-
cation Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 361, 370 (1979).
20 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 180.
21 Id.
22 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
23 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
24 Id. at 228.
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lineup he is not likely to go back on his word later on;25 and (3) it is
difficult to reconstruct at trial what actually occurred during the pro-
cedure. 26 The likelihood of erroneous identification is further in-
creased where a showup or single photo display of the suspect is
involved.27 Finally, a defendant who engages in plea bargaining fol-
lowing a pre-trial identification loses the protection of having that
identification verified by cross-examination at trial.28
In response to a growing awareness that pre-trial procedures
may cause identification inaccuracies, the Supreme Court in 1967
recognized two constitutional protections against unfair identifica-
tion procedures. 29 These constitutional protections were designed
to prevent mistaken convictions by minimizing the possibility of un-
fairness inherent in identification procedures.
30
In United States v. Wade,31 the first Supreme Court case reversing
a conviction based on suggestive identification procedures, the
Court guaranteed the sixth amendment right of counsel32 to crimi-
nal defendants at any critical confrontation by the prosecution,33 in-
cluding lineups.3 4  Under the exclusionary rule of Wade,
identifications made in violation of the sixth amendment are per se
inadmissible. The Court also held that an in-court identification
made after the suggestive lineup was inadmissible, 35 unless there
25 Id. at 229.
26 Id. at 230.
27 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968).
28 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 180.
29 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (right to due process of law
upheld in conduct of an identification confrontation); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 237 (1967) (the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to criminal defendants at
pre-trial hearings).
30 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297-98.
31 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
32 The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (emphasis supplied). In Wade the Court held that the guarantee applied
whenever necessary to assure a meaningful defense, i.e., at the "critical stages" of crimi-
nal proceedings. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-25.
33 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224. The defendant, Wade, was convicted of robbing a bank on
the basis of eyewitness testimony. Prior to trial, an FBI agent arranged a lineup includ-
ing Wade without notifying Wade's attorney. Each person in the lineup was required to
wear strips of tape on his face and to say certain words as the robber allegedly had done.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Wade's conviction on the grounds that
holding a lineup without the accused's counsel violated his sixth amendment right. Id. at
221.
34 Id. at 237. The Court held that a lineup was a critical part of a criminal proceeding
at which a suspect was entitled to the assistance of counsel. Id.
35 Id. at 239-40. The Wade exclusionary rule was applied to state prosecutions in
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), where the defendant was subjected to a sug-
gestive lineup without the assistance of counsel.
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was "clear and convincing evidence" showing that the identification
had a basis independent of the pre-trial proceedings.
36
The Court subsequently has required that certain conditions be
met before the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to pre-trial
identification procedures. The right to counsel now attaches only at
or after the initiation of formal judicial criminal proceedings. 3 7 For
example, there is no right to counsel at a display of photos or other
reproductions, including one of the suspect to witnesses. 38 Lineups
and showups, on the other hand, are critical stages in pre-trial pro-
ceedings because of the potential unfairness to the accused at that
point.3
9
Counsel's presence during pre-trial identification proceedings
is required to ensure fairness to the accused. 40 The requirement
operates under two assumptions: (1) that the likelihood of an unac-
ceptably suggestive identification is reduced when the suspect is as-
sisted by counsel; and (2) that if impermissible conduct occurs at an
identification lineup or showup, counsel will be able to effectively
challenge the identification evidence at trial to prevent a conviction
based on an unreliable identification.
4'
In Stovall v. Denno,42 the Court recognized the constitutional
right of due process of law in connection with pre-trial identification
procedures. The suspect in Stovall was subjected to a showup in a
hospital room before the sole eyewitness to the crime.43 The Court
36 Wade, 388 U.S. at 240. The Court in Wade thus recognized that evidence free from
the "illegal taint" of the pre-trial procedure should be presented to the trier of fact. The
crux of the independent basis test is whether the witness is identifying the defendant
solely on the basis of his memory of events at the time of the crime, or whether he is
merely remembering the person he picked out in a pre-trial identification. The Court
enumerated criteria in Wade to determine whether the in-court identifications by wit-
nesses who attended the illegal lineup were nevertheless admissible:
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any dis-
crepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual descrip-
tion, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, a failure to identify the defendant on a
prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.
Id. at 241.
37 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972). In Kirby the Court affirmed the
Illinois Appellate Court finding that the per se exclusionary rule of Wade and Gilbert did
not apply to pre-indictment confrontations.
38 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).
39 Wade, 388 U.S. at 237. A preliminary hearing at which the defendant is identified
also is a critical state at which the right to counsel exists. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
220, 231-32 (1977).
40 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 237.
41 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 298.
42 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
43 Id. at 295. The suspect in Stovall was handcuffed to a police officer and was re-
1326 [Vol. 75
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
held that evidence obtained by an identification procedure that was
"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification" was inadmissible. 44 The use of such evidence would
violate a defendant's right to due process of law. 45 The Court found
that the showup procedure in Stovall was suggestive, but not unnec-
essarily so under the "totality of the circumstances. ' 46 In Stovall,
the identification procedure was justified only because the police
were unsure how long the witness would live. Because the Court in
Stovall did not find a due process violation, the per se exclusionary
rule did not apply. A similar result was reached in Simmons v. United
States47 where the Court held that a suggestive photographic identi-
fication procedure was not violative of due process given the factual
circumstances of the case.
48
After the decisions in Stovall and Simmons a suggestive identifi-
cation procedure did not violate a defendant's due process rights as
long as it could be justified by necessity.4 9 Identification evidence
was rarely inadmissible under this approach. 50 After Stovall, the
quired to say words similar to those used by the assailant at trial. The witness testified at
trial about the hospital identification and made an in-court identification. Id.
44 Id. at 302 (citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966)).
45 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. The Court in Stovall first decided that the Wade and Gilbert
right to counsel principles would not apply retroactively. The suspect's right to chal-
lenge the identification evidence, however, was upheld independent of any right to
counsel claim.
46 Id. at 302. The Court condemned the use of the showup procedure but found that
the need for immediate identification had made it imperative. The assault victim in
Stovall was the sole eyewitness to the murder and could not attend the usual police sta-
tion lineup. The Court found no due process violation in the conduct of the confronta-
tion. Id. See also Purcell, supra note 7, at 1082 n.34.
47 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
48 The photographic identification in Simmons was held in connection with a bank
robbery that had occurred the previous day. Witnesses were shown a series of photos,
consisting mostly of group photographs where Simmons was prominently featured sev-
eral times. The Court upheld the witnesses' in-court identifications on the grounds that
the possible prejudice in the earlier identifications was unavoidable under the circum-
stances where a serious felony had been committed, and it was important for the FBI to
determine whether to continue their search for the criminals. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384-
85.
49 Legal commentators have argued that the standards in Stovall and in Simmons are
not the same. Justice Marshall, for example, in his dissent to Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98 (1977), stated that Stovall governed the introduction of evidence of a pre-trial
out-of-court identification while Simmons pertained to possible due process violations
in the introduction of in-court identifications that were "tainted" by improper pre-trial
procedures. Id. at 120-21 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Furthermore, in Simmons the Court
seemed to emphasize the reliable nature of the evidence obtained, rather than the sug-
gestive nature of the procedure involved. See Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court
Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1109 n.82
(1974).
50 But see Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). In Foster, the one Supreme Court
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Supreme Court considered another approach to the admission of
eyewitness testimony in Neil v. Biggers.51 In Biggers, the Court shifted
its due process focus from the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure itself to the likelihood of misidentification in the particu-
lar case.52
B. CURRENT STANDARDS GOVERNING ADMISSION
OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
The Biggers approach to the admission of eyewitness testimony
balances the prosecution's need for reliable identification evidence
against the defendant's right to be free from suggestive procedures
causing misidentification. Thus, the scope of due process protec-
tion in the modern line of identification cases focuses on whether
the identification is reliable.
In Neil v. Biggers,53 the Supreme Court stated that it was the
"likelihood of misidentification" that violates a defendant's right to
due process. 54 Biggers involved a showup identification between a
rape victim and a suspect held seven months after the incident. 55
The Biggers Court held that all the identification testimony, includ-
ing in-court identifications and testimony as to out-of-court identifi-
cations, was admissible despite any claims of suggestive
identification procedures56 if the identification was shown to be reli-
able. Justice Powell, writing for the majority57 in Biggers, outlined
five factors that affect the reliability of an identification:
case in which evidence was excluded under Stovall, the Court held that a series of con-
frontations between the witness and the suspect were so suggestive as to violate due
process of law.
51 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
52 Id. at 199.
53 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
54 Id. at 198. The district court in Biggers held that a confrontation constituted a due
process violation where it was "so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a substan-
tial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court. The Supreme Court decided in Biggers that unnecessarily suggestive pro-
cedures alone do not require exclusion of identification evidence. Id. at 199.
55 Id. at 201. The Court noted that the witness had viewed numerous suspects dur-
ing the seven months prior to her identification and had never found anyone resembling
the suspect. Id.
56 Id. at 200-01. The Biggers Court thus eliminated the distinction between in-court
and out-of-court identification testimony by applying Simmons, which involved the admis-
sibility of an in-court identification in the wake of a suggestive out-of-court identifica-
tion, to the admissibility of testimony of the pre-trial identification itself. Biggers
reasoned that one standard should apply in both cases, because in either case, "the pri-
mary evil to be avoided is 'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifica-
tion.'" Id. at 198.
57 Powell was joined in his majority opinion by Burger, CJ., White, Blackmun, and
RehnquistJ.J. Id. at 189.
1328 [Vol. 75
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(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of
time between the crime and confrontation.
58
The Biggers guidelines were adopted in Manson v. Brathwaite59
where the Court held that "reliability is the linchpin in determining
the admissibility of identification evidence. ' 60 At the trial in
Brathwaite, the witness testified as to his prior out-of-court identifica-
tion of the suspect.6 1 The Court did not deny that the identification
procedure had been unduly suggestive, 62 but noted that the evi-
dence nonetheless possessed qualities of reliability.63  The
Brathwaite Court evaluated two approaches to the admissibility of
identification evidence-the per se exclusion rule64 and the "totality
of the circumstances" approach.65 The per se rule rejected the ad-
58 Id. at 199. The Court applied these factors, finding that the victim spent a consid-
erable period of time with her assailant-up to one-half an hour. The victim directly
observed the suspect indoors and under a full moon outdoors, and testified that she had
"no doubt" that respondent was her assailant. Her description to the police was thor-
ough. The Court thus concluded that there was "no substantial likelihood of misiden-
tification" in the case. Id. at 201.
This test is similar to the Wade independent basis test. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 241.
The difference between the Wade and Biggers approaches is that Biggers would overlook
the suggestiveness of the procedure if the witness claims to be certain. Biggers, 409 U.S.
at 199. This illustrates the Supreme Court's shift from emphasizing the suggestiveness
of the procedure to considering the reliability of the identification itself.
59 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
60 Id. at 114.
61 Id. at 102. In Brathwaite, a narcotics agent identified the suspect as the person who
had sold him drugs. He made the identification from a single photo. Id at 101. The
court of appeals held that the identification was unnecessarily and impermissibly sugges-
tive, and thus should have been excluded. Manson v. Brathwaite, 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.
1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). Because the Biggers identification occurred prior to the
decision in Stovall, courts were unsure whether Biggers would apply to post-Stovall out-of-
court identification evidence. Brathwaite thus established that the Biggers reliability stan-
dard also controlled in cases after Stovall. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
62 432 U.S. at 99.
63 Id. at 114-16. The qualities of reliability relied on by the Court in Brathwaite were
determined by use of the factors set out in Biggers. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
The evidence was reliable because: (1) the witness had a good opportunity to view
the defendant at the apartment door; (2) the witness had a high degree of attention,
because he was not a casual observer as is often the case with eyewitnesses; (3) the de-
scription of the criminal was accurate; (4) the witness demonstrated a high degree of
certainty at the identification; and (5) the witness' photographic identification took place
only two days after the crime. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114-16.
64 Id. at 110. The court of appeals relied upon the per se exclusionary rule and held
that the showing of only one photograph to the witness was unnecessarily and impermis-
sibly suggestive. Under this approach, all identification evidence resulting from the
tainted procedure was excluded. See Brathwaite, 527 F.2d at 366-71.
65 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110. The totality approach, in contrast to the per se ap-
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mission of any identification evidence based on an unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedure. The totality approach permit-
ted admission of identification evidence if, despite the suggestive
procedure involved, the evidence was likely to be accurate. The
Court examined whether the approaches served the interests of pre-
serving reliable eyewitness evidence and deterring improper police
procedures, and examined the effects on the administration ofjus-
tice.66 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that
the per se approach did not serve these interests to the same extent
as did the totality approach. 67 He stated that the per se approach
suffered particular drawbacks with regard to its effect on the admin-
istration of justice because "it denies the trier reliable evidence, it
may result, on occasion, in the guilty going free."
68
Brathwaite, however, qualified the Biggers Court's exclusive use
of reliability as the admissibility standard for eyewitness testimony.
The Court held that the reliability of the testimony, as determined
by the factors announced in Biggers, must be weighed against the
suggestiveness of the procedure used.69 If a court concluded that
the corrupting effects of a suggestive identification procedure out-
weighed the indicators of reliability surrounding the testimony, the
identification testimony would be excluded. 70 This method allows
proach, permitted admission of identification evidence if, despite the suggestive proce-
dure involved, the evidence possessed qualities of reliability. Id. Thus, neither out-of-
court nor in-court identifications were inadmissible merely because suggestive proce-
dures were used.
66 Id. at 111-13.
67 Id. at 112. Justice Blackmun thought that both approaches would encourage
presenting reliable eyewitness testimony to the jury. He noted, however, that the per se
rule would go too far in automatically excluding certain testimony without regard to
other competing interests. Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 114. After Brathwaite, some courts have employed a two-step analysis in
which the defendant must prove that the identification procedure used was unduly sug-
gestive before the court will consider reliability under Biggers. See Project, Twelfth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1981-1982, 71
GEO. L.J. 339, 421 n.504 (1982). Other courts explicitly balance the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure against the reliability of the evidence. Id. at 421 n.505.
In a recent case, Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.) cert. granted, judgment
vacated as moot, 464 U.S. 957 (1983) appeal dismissed 721 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court seemed to reject the two-step approach. In Sumner, the court indicated that it was
concerned only with the reliability of the evidence in question: "the need, or lack of it,
for the identification procedures employed by the prosecution's officers plays no part in
the determination of the admissibility of identification evidence, a determination that
focuses solely on reliability." Id. at 1254.
70 Courts have developed guidelines to determine when suggestive identification
procedures have occurred. In United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1980), the
court suggested that indicia of improper influence would be shown by: (1) the presence
and influence of other witnesses at the pre-trial identification procedure; and (2) the
[Vol. 751330
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the manner of the identification procedure to be considered in the
due process calculus, but avoids the effects of a stricter rule that
could prevent critical evidence from reaching a jury.
7'
Commentators have criticized recent cases for abandoning the
early protections guaranteed by the Supreme Court against sugges-
tive identification procedures. 72 In Kirby v. Illinois,73 for example,
the Court held that the Wade right to counsel does not arise until the
initiation of formal proceedings against a defendant. 74 More re-
cently, in Watkins v. Sowders,75 the Court held that hearings on ques-
tionable identification testimony are not required to be held outside
the presence of the jury.76 Critics of these cases have argued that
the decisions have dismantled the constitutional safeguards set up
to prevent mistaken eyewitness identifications. 77 Even Biggers and
Brathwaite are considered to undermine the earlier due process pro-
tections against unnecessarily suggestive identification proce-
dures. 78 Furthermore, a number of psychologists have argued that
the "reliability factors" used by the Supreme Court in Biggers lack an
empirical basis and are inconsistent with psychological data.
79
conduct of government agents tending to focus the witness' attention on the defendant.
Id. at 867.
71 The Court in Brathwaite relied in part upon "the good sense and judgment of
American juries" in reaching its decision. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116. The Court con-
cluded that the danger in allowing identification evidence with questionable features is
mitigated by jurors' abilities to weigh the evidence. Id.
72 See, e.g., Levine & Tapp, supra note 10, at 1079-81; Pulaski, supra note 49, at 1103;
Woocher, supra note 1, at 996-98.
73 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
74 Id. at 690. Critics of the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby claim that police now
often delay bringing formal charges against a defendant until after the identification has
been made. See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 187.
75 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
76 Id. at 349. Watkins involved two cases where the defendants were convicted in
state court on the basis of eyewitness identifications. Id. at 342-46. In both cases, the
Court denied the defendants' request for in camera suppression hearings on the identifi-
cation evidence and refused to reverse the convictions. Id. at 349. The Court in Watkins
distinguished this situation from that of a hearing for the suppression of a possible in-
voluntary confession, where an in camera hearing is required. Id. at 347. This procedure
was not considered necessary in Watkins because the determination of the reliability of
the evidence was entrusted to the jury and because 'cross-examination would be suffi-
cient to preserve the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 349. The Court in Watkins,
however, left open the possibility that in camera hearings on identification evidence
might be permitted in other cases; the court concluded only that such hearings were not
constitutionally required in every case. Id.
77 See supra note 72.
78 See Pulaski, supra note 49, at 1103; Comment, supra note 8, at 1398-99. These
commentators suggest that the due process protection of Stovall has been destroyed by
the Bigger and Brathwaite focus on reliability of identification procedures.
79 See, e.g., Uelman, Testing the Assumptions of Neil v. Biggers: An Experiment in Eyewit-
ness Identification, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 358, 368 (1980).
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As Section IV of this Comment will demonstrate, 0 the current
standards governing the admission of eyewitness testimony, while
imperfect, at present are useful in controlling unreliable eyewitness
testimony. The more recent cases such as Kirby and Watkins have
defined the scope of a defendant's constitutional rights in a manner
compatible with other competing interests. 8' The standards in
Brathwaite provide an all-encompassing due process test that consid-
ers the degree of suggestiveness surrounding an identification pro-
cedure as well as the likely reliability of the identification.
8 2
Furthermore, the Brathwaite standards uphold the function of the
jury by allowing reliable evidence to be presented to the trier of fact.
Although the present standards for admission of eyewitness
testimony are sufficient, the problem remains that mistaken identifi-
cations may also result from the inherent unreliability of eyewitness
testimony itself. The failure of the legal system to address this prob-
lem suggests that there is little that courts can do about eyewitness
inaccuracy. Thus, until the present, questions about the reliability
of eyewitness testimony have been left to the jury.83 Psychologists,
however, in increasing numbers, now argue that the legal system
can control errors in eyewitness testimony by admitting into the
courtroom psychological evidence on eyewitness testimonial accu-
racy.84 Exclusion of this evidence, in their opinion, is tantamount to
depriving the jury of relevant information necessary to determine
what weight to give to the eyewitness testimony.
80 See infra notes 239-309 and accompanying text.
81 In Kirby, for example, the Court reasoned that the right to counsel should not
apply before the start of formal criminal proceedings because it was only then that a
suspect's right to be protected from suggestive procedures outweighed society's interest
in investigating and limiting crime. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 691.
82 Reliability thus remains the deciding criterion of admissibility. See United States v.
Phillips, 640 F.2d 87, 94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991 (1981). Yet courts continue
to find that procedures are occasionally so suggestive as to give rise to misidentifications
in violation of due process. See, e.g., Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir.) cert.
granted, judgment vacated as moot, 464 U.S. 957 (1983) appeal dismissed, 721 F.2d 1251 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1980); Green v. Loggins,
614 F.2d 219, 223-25 (9th Cir. 1980).
83 Once evidence has been admitted, the determination of its proper weight and
credibility is a function traditionally considered within the province of the jury. Courts
are generally reluctant to usurp any of the jury's functions. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449
U.S. 341, 347 (1981).
84 See infra notes 183-238 and accompanying text.
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III. EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY
A. SUBSTANCE OF TESTIMONY
The proposed psychological expert testimony on eyewitness
testimony would concern "those factors which scientific research
has shown to be critically important in affecting the ability to make a
correct identification." 85 Psychologists argue that their presenta-
tion of relevant research on "forgetting" and the reasons that wit-
nesses deviate from perfect recall would aid the jury in evaluating
identification testimony.8
6
Psychological research on eyewitness accuracy is concerned
with the operation of the human memory8 7 and with specific factors
affecting memory.88 Psychologists recognize three stages of human
memory: (1) perception; 9 (2) storage;90 and (3) retrieval.9 1 The
reliability of an eyewitness identification may be affected by various
psychological factors at each stage of the memory process.
Psychologists could explain that factors affecting memory dur-
ing the perception stage may be related to the conditions of an ob-
servation, 92 or to the emotions and experiences particular to a
witness. 93 Studies have shown, for example, that a subject's ability
to remember a face increases with the length of time allowed for
observation.94 Yet in many eyewitness reports identifications are
85 Brigham, supra note 1, at 720.
86 See supra note 11; see also E. LoFTus, supra note 1, at 191; Convis, supra note 1, at
588.
87 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 21. Loftus writes that nearly all of the theoretical
analyses of the memory process divide into three stages. Factors affecting identification
accuracy at each stage are not particular to eyewitness testimony but affect the accuracy
of all testimony. Id.
88 Loftus further divides factors affecting memory into two groups. One group in-
cludes those factors affecting person recognition in general, e.g., cross-racial identifica-
tion and unconscious transference. In the second group are factors that are particular to
individuals, e.g., the sex, age, and "training" of the witness. See id. at 136-52, 153-70.
89 See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text.
92 Factors related to the observation or to the nature of the encounter itself are
known as "event" factors. See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 23.
93 Those factors inherent in the observer are known as "witness factors." Id. at 32.
94 Id. at 23-24. Loftus reports a study where 128 subjects viewed slides showing a
particular human face; several subjects viewed these slides for ten seconds, while others
viewed them for thirty-two seconds. Approximately eight minutes later, the subjects
were asked to try to remember the faces from a series of 150 slides. The investigators
found that subjects were much more accurate in remembering a face they had seen for
the longer period of time. Id. at 23. Buckhout has reported similar results in his studies.
See Buckhout, supra note 1, at 25.
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based on fleeting glimpses alone.9 5
Research has indicated that stress and anxiety have inhibited
subjects' performance abilities in several areas, including perception
and recall.9 6 Psychologists could reveal studies displaying a nega-
tive relation between stress and eyewitness accuracy; knowledge of
great potential import to jurors.9 7 Psychologists also could show
that danger and violence, conditions often found during the com-
mission of a crime, decrease witnesses' perception and memory abil-
ities.9 8 They argue that stress and emotion inhibit perception and
may prevent testimonial accuracy because after a certain point stress
has a debilitating effect on memory.9 9
Elizabeth Loftus, a University of Washington psychology pro-
fessor, is a leading authority on eyewitness identification. Loftus has
conducted extensive research on identification and memory; she has
assisted lawyers in hundreds of cases and testified in over 90 of
95 Such "glimpses" may be common in fast moving, threatening situations. In the
Sacco-Vanzetti case in the 1920's, for example, a witness gave a detailed description of one
defendant on the basis of a fraction-of-a-second glance. Psychologist Robert Buckhout,
a researcher in the area of eyewitness identification has concluded that with regard to
the above case, "[t]he description must have been a fabrication." Buckhout, supra note
1, at 25.
Another "event factor" is the significance at the time and to the witness of the
events that were observed. Witnesses may be asked to recall seeing the accused at a time
when they were not attaching importance to the event. This occurrence may make an
eyewitness report incomplete or unreliable, because insignificant events do not motivate
a person to use his or her most selective processes of attention. Id. at 24-25.
96 Psychologist Robert Buckhout has explained the physiological relation behind this
phenomenon: "There is a response [to stress] that includes an increased heart rate,
breathing rate and blood pressure and a dramatic increase in the flow of adrenalin." Id
at 25. In experimental situations, observers under stress are less capable of remember-
ing details, less accurate in reading dials, and less accurate in detecting signals than
when under normal circumstances. Buckhout's research conducted with Air Force flight
crew members confirms that even highly trained people become poor observers under
stress. Id.
For various studies relating effects of stress on performance, see E. Lorus, supra
note 1, at 33-35 (danger situations increase anxiety and reduce performance level). For
a related study suggesting that mentally shocking episodes may disrupt the lingering
process necessary for full storage of information in memory, see Loftus & Burns, Mental
Shock Can Produce Retrograde Amnesia, 10 MEMORY & COGNrrION, 318, 318-23 (1982).
97 This concept was first stated in the Yerkes-Dodson law formulated in 1908. The
law states that strong motivational states such as stress or other emotional arousal facili-
tate learning and performance up to a point, after which point learning decreases. The
location of the point at which performance begins to decline is determined by the diffi-
culty of the task. See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 33. See also Buckhout, supra note 1, at 25
("Research confirms that even highly trained people become poorer observers under
stress."); Convis, supra note 1, at 543 (two studies show effect that emotional factors
have on witnesses' perception).
98 See Convis, supra note 1, at 593-94. Research also has indicated that subjects tend
to overestimate distance and the passage of time when under stress. Id.




Loftus has found that witnesses tend to concentrate on only a
few striking features of an event when they are highly aroused.' 0 '
This concentration results in the exclusion of certain details from
memory. Loftus has studied this phenomenon in connection with
the observation of suspects carrying guns or other weapons. In one
study on the effects of the presence of a weapon on eyewitnesses,
witnesses' descriptions of suspects were more accurate when the
suspect held a nonthreatening item than when he held a threatening
one. 102
Expert psychologists could also discuss another source of mis-
perception resulting from witness expectations.' 0 3 Two types of ex-
pectations studied by psychologists are those based on past
experience and those based on biases or stereotypes. 10 4 Two
Harvard psychologists conducted an experiment involving playing
cards in the 1930's to show how expectations can influence judg-
ment.10 5 Observers were asked to report the number of aces of
spades they had seen in a display of cards. After a brief glance the
majority of subjects believed they had seen only three aces of
spades, five were actually shown in the display. Two of the aces,
however, were colored red rather than the usual black. The observ-
ers, when making a judgment, had relied on their expectations not
on what they had actually seen. 10 6
Biases held by individuals provide another example of how ex-
pectations influence perception. Stereotypes about groups of peo-
ple based on cultural or situational differences, while often
100 See supra note 15.
101 See E. Lorus, supra note 1, at 35.
102 Id. at 35-36. Loftus conducted an experiment in which she divided subjects into
two groups and had each subject act as a "witness" to the fleeing departure of a target
individual. The situations for the groups were identical except that in one case the tar-
get suspect carried a bloodied letter opener in hand while in the other he held a pen.
The witnesses tended to give less accurate and less detailed descriptions in the situation
where the "weapon" was present. Loftus concluded that "[t]he weapon appears to cap-
ture a good deal of the victim's attention, resulting in, among other things, a reduced
ability to recall other details from the environment." Id.
103 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 36; Buckhout, supra note 1, at 26.
104 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 37-40.
105 Id. at 39. Jerome S. Bruner and Leo Postman of Harvard theorized that when
expectations are violated by the environment, the subject's behavior is a form of resist-
ance to the recognition of the unexpected. Id. at 40.
106 Id. at 39. Observers tend to rely on expectations as a way to make judgments in
everyday life. Thus, witnesses may not spend time checking their expectations against
what they actually observed, and consequently, may report facts that were not present
but that they think should have been present. See also Buckhout, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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inaccurate, affect the way people perceive and remember.10 7 Exper-
iments have demonstrated, for example, that eyewitnesses are more
likely to associate blacks than whites with violent scenes or situa-
tions.' 0 8 These expectancies and others' 0 9 are especially dangerous
because they may alter a witness's perception without any awareness
of that alteration.
Once information is acquired, it is subject to further modifica-
tion during the period when it is stored in memory. An important
factor affecting memory at this stage is the amount of time that has
lapsed since the event. 110 Psychologists express this phenomenon
with a "forgetting curve" which shows that the greatest amount of
memory loss occurs within minutes of an event."'
Psychologists assert that what is less well-known is that post-
event external information can enhance and even change mem-
ory."12 In one experiment conducted by Loftus, subjects viewed a
filmed car accident and were tested on their observations after re-
ceiving new information about the accident in the form of mislead-
ing questions. 1 3 When subjects were asked questions using the
word "smashed" as opposed to "hit" they gave higher estimates of
speed and were more likely to later report having seen broken
glass-although there was no broken glass."1 4 New information had
become integrated into previously stored data about the event, cre-
107 See E. Lovrus, supra note 1, at 37.
108 Id. at 38. Loftus described a 1948 experiment where subjects were shown a pic-
ture of a scene on a subway; a black man and a white man holding a razor blade were
standing on the train. In over half of the experiments, observers indicated that the black
man, not the white man, had been holding the razor blade. Loftus noted that the cul-
tural stereotype demonstrated by the 1947 experiment might not be as strong today. Id.
at 38-39.
109 Other expectancies described by Loftus are those resulting from personal
prejudices and from temporary biases (e.g., hunting tragedies have occurred where
hunters become separated and one shoots the other, mistaking the lost hunter for the
animal he is expecting to see and kill). Id. at 37-40.
110 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 52-53.
111 Id. at 53. The curve basically shows that a person's capacity to remember de-
creases as time since the event increases. Loftus reviewed one study where 34 subjects
were tested for recognition of pictures after intervals of two hours, three days, one week,
and about four months. The retention of the pictured material dropped from 100 per-
cent correct identification after a two-hour delay to only 57 percent correct after four
months. Id.
112 Id. at 55.
113 Loftus & Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction
Between Language and Memory, 13J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 589 (1974).
For a related study on the effectiveness of inducing resistance to misleading informa-
tion, see Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, Inducing Resistance to Misleading Information, 21 J. VER-
BAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV., 207, 218 (1982).
114 Loftus & Palmer, supra note 113, at 586-87. Loftus suggests that, over time, infor-
mation from actual perception and external information become integrated. This pro-
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ating a memory of the accident that was more serious than what had
actually occurred.
Testimony from psychological experts could further reveal that
witnesses, when asked to make an identification, tend to fill in mem-
ory gaps by adjusting their recollections or guessing.1 15 This phe-
nomenon may fulfill a psychological need to reduce uncertainty and
conform to social pressures. 116 This tendency has serious implica-
tions in the courtroom where identification procedures may en-
courage guessing so that witnesses may unconsciously "conform"
their memories to fit available suspects or photographs.
Psychologists have discovered that-during the retrieval stage of
the memory process, conditions surrounding recollection affect the
reliability of what a witness remembers. Such conditions include the
types of questions asked, 117 the wording of questions, 118 and who is
asking them. 119 Numerous studies have been conducted on the re-
lationship between confidence and accuracy in recollection. 120 A
witness' confidence in the identification traditionally has been ac-
cepted as an indication that the identification is an accurate one.
Loftus and others argue that little positive correlation exists be-
tween the two variables.
121
While the above factors may cause an eyewitness to deviate
from perfect recall of certain events or situations, the psychological
expert could explain that there are other more specific problems
cess may also happen in the courtroom where introduction of "external" information
could distort witness reports. See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 78.
115 See E. LoFTus, supra note 1, at 82-84; Buckhout, supra note 1, at 27.
116 See Buckhout, supra note 1, at 28.
117 See E. LoF-rus, supra note 1, at 90-94. Loftus reports that the narrative form of
reporting, while often less complete, is more accurate than the interrogatory form. Id. at
91.
118 Id. at 94-97. For example, the use of the definite article increases suggestibility.
There is a different effect when a questioner states: "Did you see the car?" and "Did you
see a car?" A speaker uses "the" when he assumes that the object referred to exists. Id.
at 95-96. See also Dale, Loftus & Rathbun, The Influence of the Form of the Question on Eyewit-
ness Testimony of Preschool Children, 7 J. PSYCHOLNGUISTIc RES. 269 (1978).
119 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 97-100.
120 Id. at 100-04. See also Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra note 1, at 440-48.
121 E. Lorrus, supra note 1, at 101. In general, the literature in cognitive psychology
shows a strong positive relationship between confidence and accuracy on a variety of
memory tasks. In eyewitness identification, however, Loftus and others maintain that
the confidence/accuracy relation may be nill or even negative. Id. One study revealed
that witnesses who make a false identification of a suspect can be as confident in their
identifications as are witnesses who made accurate identifications. See Wells, Lindsay &
Ferguson, supra note 1, at 440. Recently, psychological studies have indicated that addi-
tional factors must be considered before drawing conclusions about the relationship be-
tween confidence and accuracy. See Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can
We Infer Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 243, 243-60 (1980).
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associated with person recognition. Racial differences in facial iden-
tification have been traditionally noted by psychologists; racial
groups find it easier to identify members of their own race.1 22 An-
other problem relevant to suspect identifications is that a person
seen in one situation may be easily confused with or recalled as the
person seen in a second situation. This occurs because an otherwise
insignificant event may, upon recall, become merged with a more
significant event. 123 Upon recollection a witness may confuse the
face of someone seen during a non-critical situation with that of a
person involved in a later critical incident.
This phenomenon is referred to by psychologists as "uncon-
scious transference."' 124 In one example where such a "transfer-
ence" occurred, a ticket agent in a railway station was held up at
gunpoint. Subsequently, the agent identified a sailor in a lineup as
the guilty party. The sailor had a good alibi, however, and was sub-
sequently released from custody. The ticket agent was interviewed
to discover why he had misidentified the sailor. He answered that
when he saw the sailor in a lineup, his face looked familiar. The
sailor's base happened to be near the railroad station and on several
occasions prior to the robbery he had purchased tickets from the
agent. The ticket agent had mistakenly assumed that the familiarity
was based on the robbery when it was actually based on the three
times that the sailor bought train tickets.'
25
Characteristics in witnesses such as age 126 and sex 127 also can
affect eyewitness accuracy. Research in this area is complex and has
122 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 136-42. Loftus describes four studies where sub-
jects recognized faces of their own race better than faces of the other races. Whether
personal prejudice affects racial identification is disputed among psychologists. Id. at
138-39.
123 Id. at 142.
124 See Loftus, Unconscious Transference in Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 93 (1976). An experiment demonstrated that people may misidentify a face seen in
another context as that of a suspect. Fifty subjects were presented, via tape recorder, a
story concerning six fictitious college students. As each character was introduced on
tape, a photograph of that character was shown for approximately two seconds. Only
pictures of white males with medium length brown hair were used. After three days the
subjects attempted to identify the criminal in the story from a set of five photographs
presented to them. For one-half of the subjects, the criminal's face was included in the
photographs. Only the face of an incidental character was included in the photos for the
other subjects. If the tendency to choose the incidental character was no greater than
the tendency to choose one of the other non-criminals, then 20% of those who made a
selection should have chosen the incidental character. In fact, 79% of those making a
selection chose the incidental character. Id. at 94-96. The transference phenomenon is
exceptionally dangerous because in any given case it may be nearly impossible to tell
whether it has occurred or not. Id. at 98. See E. Lovrus, supra note 1, at 142-44.
125 See P. WALL, supra note 19, at 119-20.
126 See E. Lovrus, supra note 1, at 159-63. Much of the research in this area is incon-
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produced mixed results; there are, however, a few generally recog-
nized findings with regard to age. 128 Children, for example, are
known to be the least reliable and the most suggestible witnesses. 129
The critical point, psychologists maintain, is that these influences on
eyewitness accuracy exist and that their existence should be con-
veyed to jurors.
The role of the psychologist in relating the above information is
to aid jurors in evaluating the credibility of a particular witness.
While most persons could recognize whether a particular factor was
operating at the time of the crucial incident, their ability to deter-
mine whether the factor actually distorted the original memory so as
to render the testimony erroneous is limited. The psychologist does
not judge whether any particular witness is telling the truth. The
expert could describe only the aforementioned scientific phenom-
ena and indicate the extent to which, given particular facts and cir-
cumstances, such phenomena might have affected an eyewitness
identification in the case.
B. CASES REJECTING ADMISSION OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY
The majority rule in American courts is that expert psychologi-
cal testimony is inadmissible or that it is not reversible error for a
trial court to refuse to admit it.130 Until the Arizona Supreme
sistent. Under some circumstances, for example, elderly subjects have been as reliable
as younger ones. See Convis, supra note 1, at 591.
127 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 156-59. Several studies are consistent with research
showing the existence of "female-oriented" and "male-oriented" items. Women tend to
be better at recollecting female items (e.g., women's dothing, accessories, etc.) and the
opposite is true for men. See Powers, Andriks & Loftus, Eyewitness Accounts of Females and
Males, 644 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 334 (1979).
128 See E. LoFrus, supra note 1, at 159-63.
129 Id. at 60.
130 See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1008 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-84 (Ist Cir. 1979); United
States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, sub nom. Davis v.
United States, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977).
For examples of state court opinions upholding trialjudges' exclusion of eyewitness
testimony, see People v. Plascencia, 140 Cal. App. 3d. 853, 189 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807-09
(1983); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 831-32, (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973
(1977); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 165, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (1983); State v. Gallo-
way, 275 N.W.2d 736, 741-42 (Iowa 1979); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 393-95, 635
P.2d 1236, 1241-43 (1981); State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 944-45 (La. 1982); State v.
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 892-93,
404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979); State v. Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 104-05, 453 A.2d 393, 395-96
(1982).
COMMENTS
Court's January 1983 decision in State v. Chapple,'3 ' "no reported
appellate court decision had ever held that a lower court abused its
discretion in refusing to admit expert psychological testimony on
eyewitnesses."' 13 2 In excluding expert psychological testimony,
state court opinions generally conclude that juries have a general
understanding of the subject matter of the expert's testimony and
that the defendant's rights can be adequately protected by cross-
examination. Federal cases have uniformly affirmed trial judges' ex-
clusion of the expert testimony. 133 Other typical grounds relied
upon for excluding or upholding exclusion of psychological testi-
mony are that it invades the province of the jury, unduly discredits
eyewitnesses' testimony, and may result in a "battle of the experts"
that will confuse the jury.'
34
The Ninth Circuit's 1973 decision in United States v. Amaral135 is
the seminal case holding that a trial court's exclusion of expert psy-
chological testimony was not in error. The defendant in Amaral was
charged with the robbery of two national banks. Three witnesses
had observed the robber during the crime and later made positive
identifications of the defendant. 136 At trial the defendant sought to
introduce expert psychological testimony, consisting of a descrip-
tion of the effects of stress on perception and the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony. 137 In excluding the proposed testimony, the
trial court concluded that it was up to the jury to make their own
determination as to what weight or effect to give to the evidence of
the eyewitness and identifying witness rather than to have that de-
termination put before them by the expert witness.' 38
131 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
132 State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980).
133 See Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (1983) (citing
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982);
United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-84 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Watson,
587 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, sub nom. Davis v. United States, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150-51 (9th Cir.
1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 395
F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1975)).
134 See Comment, supra note 8, at 1401 n.66 and cases cited therein.
135 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
136 Id. at 1153.
137 Id. The facts in Amaral resemble those in the majority of cases in this area. Typi-
cally, the cases are dependent upon eyewitness testimony. Defense counsel will attempt
to admit the expert psychological testimony. Following the trial court's denial of the
testimony and the subsequent conviction of the defendant, the defendant will appeal on
the grounds that refusal to admit the testimony constituted prejudicial error. See E. LoF-
Tus, supra note 1, at 199-200.
138 488 F.2d at 1153. Courts are generally reluctant to usurp any of the jury's func-
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The Amaral court adopted a liberal standard for the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony; testimony is admissible as long as it gives
the jury "appreciable help."' 13 9 The criteria established in Amaral
were that: (1) the expert must be qualified as such; (2) the expert
testimony must pertain to a proper subject; (3) the testimony must
be in accordance with a generally accepted explanatory theory; and
(4) the testimony's probative value must outweigh its prejudicial
effect. 14
0
In Amaral the court determined that the proposed testimony did
not meet the "proper subject" requirement because the expert's
testimony would not assist the jury in evaluating the eyewitness tes-
timony.14 1 The court held that the jury was competent to evaluate
the reliability of the eyewitness testimony and the effect of stress on
the perception of witnesses through counsel's use of cross-examina-
tion and through its own good sense. 142 Four years after Amaral, in
Dyas v. United States,14 3 the court relied heavily on the Amaral analysis
in upholding the lower court's exclusion of the expert psychological
testimony.144 The Dyas court noted further that "the admission of
expert testimony is committed to the broad discretion of the trial
court and . . . will not be disturbed unless 'manifestly
dons. One reason for this policy is a fear of tipping the scales favorably toward either
the defendant or the prosecution. Expert psychological testimony, as viewed by most
courts, amounts to an invasion of the jury's province in favor of the defendant. See Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 1400 n.60. See also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981)
("[T]he only duty of a jury in cases in which identification evidence has been admitted
will often be to assess the reliability of that evidence." (emphasis in original)).
139 Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152. Other courts have allowed expert testimony only when
the subject was one about which a layjury could not make a rational decision without the
aid of expert opinion. For a discussion of the development of the expert opinion excep-
tion, see Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 774, 774-75 (1980).
140 Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153. In upholding the trial court's decision, the Amaral court
incorporated the general acceptance test of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), for admission of scientific evidence into its own four-part admissibility test. In
Frye, the court held inadmissible testimony based upon the results of a lie detector exam-
ination because the technique had not achieved general scientific recognition. The
court argued that until a scientific technique reaches a point where it is accepted as valid
by other scientists in the field, testimony based on novel scientific techniques is too un-
trustworthy to be admitted into evidence. Id. at 1014.
141 Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153.
142 Id. The Amaral court did not address the questions of whether the testimony met
the general acceptance standard or caused unfair prejudice or confusion. Id. at 1153-
54.
143 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977).
144 Id. at 832. The eyewitness in Dyas was the victim of an armed robbery. He gave a
detailed description of the suspect to the police immediately after the event and identi-
fied the defendant in a lineup several days later and in court. Id. at 829.
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erroneous.' "145
In addition to the criteria set out in Amaral, the admission of all
expert testimony in federal courts after the 1975 adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence1 46 is governed by Rule 702.147 Approxi-
mately one-half of the states have adopted Rule 702 or have a rule
of evidence closely related to it.148 Rule 702 permits the introduc-
tion of expert testimony in the form of an opinion or otherwise
when it will help the jury to understand the evidence presented or to
decide an issue in the case.' 49 A liberal standard exists for deter-
mining when science will "assist" the jury. 150 If the subject of the
testimony is wholly within ordinary experience, however, expert tes-
timony would not be helpful to a jury and will be disallowed.15 1 The
Ninth Circuit has continued to use both Rule 702 and the Amaral
standard in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.' 52
The expert must be properly qualified to testify in court before
ajury will be allowed to hear the expert testimony. In United States v.
Dyas,15 3 the court restated this criteria: "'[T]he witness must have
sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to
make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier
in his search for truth.' "1-54 A similar standard exists under Rule
702.155 Expert testimony on eyewitness identification generally is
not excluded on the basis of the expert's qualifications because their
145 Id. at 831. See also Taylor v. United States, 451 A.2d 859 (D.C. 1982); Brooks v.
United States, 448 A.2d 253 (D.C. 1982); Smith v. United States 389 A.2d 1356 (D.C.
1978). These cases all applied Dyas and affirmed lower court decisions to exclude expert
testimony on the subject of eyewitness identification.
146 Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1296 (codified at 28 U.S.C. App. A. (1976)).
147 Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
148 See Convis, supra note 1, at 585 ("It appears, then, that the rule is a popular one
and contains a statement about the admission of expert testimony agreeable to the Leg-
islatures or courts in about half the country.").
149 See supra note 147.
150 See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381-83 (Ist Cir. 1979) ("Courts and commen-
tators view Rule 702 as admitting testimony liberally."). See also Note, supra note 139, at
782.
151 See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383.
152 See Note, supra note 139, at 778 n.26. Federal cases affirming lower courts' exclu-
sion of expert psychological testimony have used the same reasoning whether they deal
with matters arising before or after the effective date of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See supra note 133.
153 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977).
154 Id. at 832 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-31 (E. Cleary, 2d ed.
1972)) (emphasis added in Dyas).
155 See supra note 147.
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training can be shown like that of any expert's. 156
Psychological testimony has been excluded by courts because it
failed to meet the "generally accepted scientific theory" require-
ment announced in Amaral. In United States v. Fosher,157 the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated that "the offer did not make clear that
the testimony. . would be based upon a mode of scientific analysis
that meets any of the standards of reliability applicable to scientific
evidence."' 158 Similarly, in People v. Plasencia,159 a California trial
court concluded that the subject matter of the expert's testimony
"had not yet reached a state of acceptability in the legal community
and therefore could not be used at trial." 160 In the New York deci-
sion of People v. Brown,16 1 the court held that there was no showing
that the expert's research had reached the level of general accept-
ance in the field of scientific inquiry. 162 The Brown court stressed
that special care was needed in admitting into evidence the results
of tests unless their accuracy and general scientific acceptance was
clearly recognized. 1
63
The primary inquiry with regard to the admission of expert psy-
chological testimony is whether it constitutes a "proper subject" of
expert scientific evidence. In United States v. Fosher,164 the court held
that to be a proper subject of expert testimony under Rule 702,
"proof offered to add to [the jurors'] knowledge must present them
with a system of analysis that the court, in its discretion, can find
reasonably likely to add to common understanding of the particular
issue before the jury."'165 The Fosher court concluded that under
this test the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding that
the offer of expert testimony was too broad and sufficiently within
the ken of lay jurors to satisfy Rule 702.166
Numerous cases have excluded expert psychological testimony
because the testimony was not beyond the common knowledge of
the jury and therefore did not constitute a proper subject of expert
testimony. The court in the California case of People v. Plasencia 167
156 See E. Lorrus, supra note 1, at 195-96 ("[T]he judge can examine the evidence for
the knowledge, experience, training or education of the proffered expert.").
157 590 F.2d 381 (Ist Cir. 1979).
158 Id. at 383.
159 168 Cal. App.3d 546, - Cal. Rptr. - (1985).
160 Id. at 554, - Cal. Rptr. at -.
161 117 Misc. 2d 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1983).
162 Id. at 593, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
163 Id.
164 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
165 Id. at 383.
166 Id.
167 168 Cal. App. 3d 546, - Cal. Rptr. - (1985).
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stated: "The jury did not need edification on the obvious fact that
an unprovoked gang attack is a stressful event or that the passage of
time frequently effects one's memory."' 68 InJohnson v. State' 69 the
court found that it was within the jury's knowledge that" 'a person
being attacked. . . undergoes stress that might cloud a subsequent
identification.' ,,170 In State v. Fernald, 17' the court held that the
making of direct face-to-face judgments of identification, and an
awareness of the factors bearing on the reliability of such judgments
are "a part of the day-to-day experiences of ordinary lay people
"172
The final criteria discussed in Amaral is the probative value of
the testimony compared to its prejudicial effect. Expert psychologi-
cal testimony can raise special dangers of unfair prejudice given the
"aura of reliability" that accompanies scientific evidence.1 73 In the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the balancing of prejudice and probative
value is governed by Rule 403.174 Under Rule 403, evidence that is
a proper subject of expert testimony is nevertheless inadmissible if
it confuses the issues, misleads the jury or results in undue con-
sumption of time.
175
The subjective nature of the testimony increases courts' con-
cern over its prejudicial effect. Scientific testimony that addresses
the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of their testimony is
suspect because the testimony of the expert might replace jurors'
own determinations of which witnesses to believe.' 76
168 Id. at 555, - Cal. Rptr. -,
169 393 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1981).
170 Id. at 1072 (quoting Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
171 397 A.2d 194 (Me. 1979).
172 Id. at 197.
173 See, e.g., State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 945 (La. 1982) ("ITihe prejudicial effect
of such testimony outweighs its probative value because of the substantial risk that the
potential persuasive appearance of the expert witness will have a greater influence on
the jury than other evidence presented during trial. Such evidence invades the province
of the jury and usurps its function.").
174 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID.
403.
175 Id. See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383-84. See also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,
641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982) ("the probative value of the evidence
was substantially outweighed by the possibility of prejudice emanating from this 'expert'
testimony"). Courts are thus careful to limit the circumstances in which expert testimony
is admissible. An overly liberal rule would allow expert testimony on subjects within the
jurors' ability to evaluate.
176 See Note, supra note 139, at 777-78.
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The principle underlying Rule 702 and the admission criteria of
Amaral is that the province of the jury must be protected. 177 Admis-
sion of expert psychological testimony is considered by a majority of
courts to usurp the function of a jury because it concerns a subject
within jurors' common knowledge and has a prejudicial effect with
regard to other evidence presented at trial. It is the jury's exclusive
province to evaluate evidence presented.
The trial court has discretion to determine whether expert psy-
chological testimony fails to meet any of the relevant admissibility
criteria. 178 The role of the trial court is particularly important in the
balancing of prejudice and probative value because the trial court is
best situated to weigh the conflicting facts and equitable considera-
tions that may vary from case to case. 179 The trial court's discretion-
ary power is relied upon by appellate courts upholding lower court
decisions excluding expert psychological testimony; the trial court
decisions will not be disturbed unless "manifestly erroneous."'
8 0
In conclusion, with the exception of State v. Chapple,'8' appellate
courts have uniformly affirmed trial judges' exercise of discretion to
exclude such expert testimony. Such testimony not only fails to
meet the standards for admission of scientific evidence, but also
raises new administrative problems.' 8 2 Thus, courts until now have
wisely relied upon jurors' abilities to appropriately weigh the evi-
dence presented at trial without assistance from psychological
experts.
C. ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE ADMISSION OF EXPERT
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
Despite overwhelming caselaw to the contrary, psychologists
and legal authorities in increasing numbers have argued for the ad-
mission of expert psychological testimony.'83 Expert testimony on
eyewitness reliability has been admitted in many state court criminal
proceedings.' 8 4 This dangerous trend culminated recently in State
177 See supra note 173.
178 See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962).
179 See Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152.
180 Id. See also Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983)
("When the question whether expert testimony would aid the jury is close, the likeli-
hood of prejudice from the admission or exclusion of that testimony is slight. Thus,
appellate courts have given great deference to rulings of trial judges in this area of the
law of evidence." Id. at -, 453 N.E.2d at 1209).
181 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
182 See infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 11 and 15 and sources cited therein.
184 See cases cited in sources, supra note 15.
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v. Chapple,185 where the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a lower
court decision refusing to permit the introduction of expert psycho-
logical testimony.
The growing number of trial courts allowing expert psychologi-
cal testimony set the stage for the ground-breaking decision in Chap-
p/e.186 Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus, for example, has been
permitted to testify in over 90 criminal cases. 87 In one case in
which Loftus testified, eyewitness identification was the sole evi-
dence connecting the defendant to the crime. That case, People v.
Garcia,188 involved a store robbery in which one store clerk was shot.
The surviving clerk identified the defendant as the robber three
weeks later from a six-photo display.' 89 Seven weeks after the inci-
dent, a security patrolman who had been driving by the store at the
time of the crime identified the defendant. He later admitted to see-
ing the defendant's picture in the newspaper.190
At the defendant's trial, Loftus testified about the nature of
human memory and how it was affected by factors such as lapse of
time, cross-racial identification, and unconscious transference.19'
The jury then was free to apply these factors to the facts of the case.
Testimony about cross-racial identification was relevant because the
clerk and patrolman were white while the robber was Mexican. The
jury was unable to reach a verdict in People v. Garcia either at the
trial's conclusion or at a retrial. 192 In Loftus' opinion, this outcome
most likely was due to the jurors' questions that arose after hearing
Loftus testify about the identifications.'19
The expert psychological testimony of Dr. Robert Buckhout 94
also has been admitted by numerous trial courts. Buckhout has de-
scribed a murder case in Lansing, Michigan' 95 where he was allowed
185 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
186 See supra note 15.
187 Telephone interview with Dr. Elizabeth F. Loftus (Jan. 18, 1984); see supra note 15.
188 See E. Lo-rus, supra note 1, at 204-15.
189 Id. at 210.
190 Id. at 212-13.
191 Id. at 213-14.
192 Id. at 214-15.
198 Id.
194 Dr. Buckhout,'editor-in-chief of SociAt ACTION & THE LAW, is another leading fig-
ure on the topic of expert psychological testimony. In a phone interview, Buckhout
emphasized that cases allowing expert psychological evidence have not all resulted in
acquittals. Thus, he argues that expert psychological testimony is not prejudicial in the
sense of being overpersuasive. Telephone interview with Robert Buckhout, PhD. (Jan.
20, 1984).
195 Michigan v. Hall & McGill, No. 75-25859-FY (County of Ingham Cir. Ct., Oct. 8,




to testify and where the defendant was acquitted. His testimony,
like Loftus', consisted of an explanation of factors causing an eye-
witness of a crime to deviate from the ideal of a "perfect witness."
Buckhout discussed the contribution psychological testimony would
make to the common experience of jurors:
Our scientific contribution comes from our use of previously checked
filmed crimes to test hundreds of eyewitnesses with the same crime
where we can check the accuracy against a true record of the events.
We learn much about the typical response of average normal witnesses
under unique conditions inherent in viewing a crime .... All of
these findings combine to permit an expert to provide the court and
the jury a more complete understanding of the eyewitness in the scien-
tific literature-sources of data which are not commonly read by lay-
men. Laymen who compare their own experiences are rarely able to
check their eyewitness accounts against an objective standard for
accuracy. 19
6
The Michigan case, like other cases in which Buckhout has testi-
fied and the defendant was acquitted, was unreported. Thus, in
cases where psychologists have been permitted to testify, the de-
fendant's acquittal has meant that no record exists of the judge's
reaction to the testimony. Buckhout maintains that such testimony
was properly admitted in those cases because it met the criteria
under Amaral and under the Federal Rules for the admission of
novel scientific evidence.197
State v. Chapple'98 represents the first reported appellate court
decision in which the trial court's exclusion of expert psychological
testimony was deemed reversible error. The Chapple court con-
cluded that the expert testimony was admissible under both Arizona
Rule of Evidence 702 and the Amaral standards for admissibility of
scientific evidence. 199
The defendant Dolan Chapple had been convicted at trial of
three counts of murder and two drug-trafficking charges. Chapple's
conviction was based in large part on the identification testimony of
two eyewitnesses. One of the eyewitnesses, Malcolm Scott, was act-
ing as a middleman in a drug sale between a Washington, D.C. drug
dealer and an Arizona drug supplier.200 Scott's sister, Pamela Buck,
was the other eyewitness in the case. The Washington, D.C. drug
dealer, Mel Coley, flew to Arizona to participate in a drug sale ar-
196 Buckhout, supra note 15, at 47-48 (based on information given by Buckhout in a
deposition) (emphasis in original).
197 See Buckhout, supra note 15, at 48-49.
198 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
199 Id. at 291-94, 660 P.2d at 1218-21.
200 Id. at 284, 660 P.2d at 1211.
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ranged by Scott. Coley was accompanied by two strangers who were
introduced as "Dee" and "Eric" to Scott.2
0 1
After the drugs had been delivered to Scott's trailer, the wit-
nesses observed Dee and the drug supplier go into one of the bed-
rooms to count the money. Scott and Buck heard gunshots and
found that the supplier and his two helpers had been killed.20 2 After
Dee and Eric had disposed of the bodies they each received $500.00
from Coley and left with the drugs. 20 3 Coley then returned by air to
Washington, D.C. Scott sought the aid of a lawyer following these
events. 20
4
Scott and Buck subsequently identified defendant as "Dee"
from a photo display, and re-identified him in a lineup and at the
trial. The first identification by the witnesses took place in Decem-
ber 1977.205 The witnesses were shown photographs by the police
containing pictures of known acquaintances of Coley. Scott pointed
to a picture of a man known as James Logan and stated that it re-
sembled Dee, though he was not sure.20 6 At this same session Scott
failed to identify the defendant as "Dee" although he was shown a
picture of the defendant in a photographic lineup.20 7
Thirteen months later, inJanuary 1979, Scott identified defend-
ant's picture as Dee in a nine-picture photo lineup. 208 This photo
lineup included pictures of Eric Perry and of the defendant. Lo-
gan's picture, however, was not included. 20 9 When Scott was shown
the picture of the defendant that he had failed to identify previously,
he stated that he had no recollection of ever having seen it before.
The defendant argued that the identifications were mistaken, and
that certain factors relating to the time and nature of the identifica-
tions combined to make them unreliable.210
At trial defense counsel offered the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth
Loftus to counter the eyewitnesses' testimony.211 The trial court
judge refused to admit the expert's testimony because the testimony
would not relate to any matters outside the jurors' common experi-
201 Id.
202 Id. at 285, 660 P.2d ?t 1212.
203 Id.
204 Id. The defendant was the sole object of prosecution in the case because Coley
had entered into a plea-bargain with the State and "Eric" was never apprehended. Id.





210 Id. at 290-91, 660 P.2d at 1217-18.
211 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ence. 212 Loftus' testimony would have informed the jury that there
are many specific variables that affect the accuracy of identification
and that these variables applied to the facts of the case. For exam-
ple, Loftus could have presented data showing that the "forgetting
curve" is not uniform and that forgetting occurs most rapidly imme-
diately after an event. 213 This phenomenon would make Scott's Jan-
uary 1979 identification of the defendant appear unreliable
following his initial failure to identify the defendant's picture when
it was first shown to him in December 1977.
Loftus also could have presented studies on the distorting ef-
fects of stress on perception and on the phenomenon of uncon-
scious transference. 214 Scott had viewed a picture of the defendant
in December, several months after the shooting, although he said
that he did not remember it. His identification of the defendant at
the January 1979 lineup could have been the result of an uncon-
scious transfer of memory. Another variable affecting eyewitness
testimony pertinent to the case was the feedback/post-event infor-
mation.2 15 Although the witnesses denied it, Scott and Buck could
have discussed Dee's identification, thus strengthening their individ-
ual identifications. Finally, Loftus would have testified that there is
little relationship between the confidence that a witness has in his or
her identification and the accuracy of that identification. 21 6 Because
both witnesses in Chapple expressed absolute certainty in their iden-
tifications, the defense argued that Loftus' testimony was relevant
on this point as well.
The appellate court concluded that the above factors would not
be known by average jurors without hearing the expert's testimony.
The Chapple court's analysis began with a discussion of Rule 702 of
the Arizona Rules of Evidence. 21 7 The court stated that Rule 702
"allows expert testimony if it 'will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' ",218 The Chapple
majority emphasized that "the test is not whether the jury could
reach some conclusion in the absence of the expert evidence, but
whether the jury is qualified without such testimony 'to determine
intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue
without enlightenment from those having a specialized understand-
212 ChappLe, 135 Ariz. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220.
213 Id. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
214 Id. at 293-94, 660 P.2d at 1221. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
215 Id. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
216 Id. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
217 Id. at 291-93, 660 P.2d at 1218-20.
218 Id. at 292, 660 P.2d at 1219 (quoting Aiuz. R. EVID. 702).
1984] 1349
COMMENTS
ing of the subject ... 219
Under the "proper subject" test of Rule 702, the Chapple court
determined first that the ordinary juror may not treat eyewitness tes-
timony with appropriate caution.220 Second, the court concluded
that the expert evidence met the "assistance requirement" of Rule
702 because Loftus' discussion of factors affecting eyewitness accu-
racy was relevant to the facts of the case. 221 Even assuming that
weaknesses in the witnesses' identifications could be elicited
through cross-examination, excluding Loftus' testimony had the ef-
fect of depriving the jurors of "the best possible degree" of under-
standing about the accuracy of the identifications. 222 The concern
over the prejudicial effect of expert testimony arises both under
Rule 702 and the Amaral criteria. The Chapple court, however, did
not find that any unfair prejudice would have resulted from admis-
sion of Loftus' testimony.2
23
After holding that the trial court could have admitted the testi-
mony, the court considered whether the trial court had abused its
discretion in refusing to admit it. The court noted the particular
importance of eyewitness accuracy to the resolution of the primary
issues in the case. 224 Reviewing the substance of Loftus' proposed
testimony, and its close connection with the facts of the case, the
court concluded that the expert testimony would have assisted the
jury on a number of the issues raised.225 Thus, the lower court's
ruling that factors affecting human memory and perception "could
be developed on cross-examination and effectively argued without
evidentiary foundation" was in error.226 The reasoning in the Chap-
pie case thus suggests that where expert psychological testimony will
be of significant assistance to the jury in resolving disputed issues of
a particular case, it should be admitted.
Despite the lack of reported caselaw supporting the admission
of expert psychological testimony, the decision in Chapple may give
advocates of this reform new influence over courts' decisions in this
area. The legal arguments favoring the admission of expert psycho-
219 Id. at 292-93, 660 P.2d at 1220 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee
note).
220 Id. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220.
221 Id. at 294, 660 P.2d at 1221.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 292, 660 P.2d at 1219. The court dismissed the problem of unfair prejudice
that the State argued would arise from Loftus' testimony: "We do not believe that this
raises the issue of unfair prejudice." Id. (emphasis in original).
224 Id. at 295, 660 P.2d at 1222.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 296, 660 P.2d at 1223.
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logical testimony rests on the liberal standard of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.227 Expert evidence must meet only the low barrier of
providing "assistance" to the jury before it is admissible. Some psy-
chologists have suggested that Rule 702 modifies the Amaral re-
quirements and allows expert testimony even where it is neither
beyond jurors' ordinary understanding nor conforms to a generally
accepted scientific theory.228 Furthermore, because the expert's
opinion may be "in the form of an opinion or otherwise," '229 support-
ers of expert psychological testimony argue that Rule 702 encour-
ages non-opinion expert testimony as was offered in Chapple.230
According to proponents of expert psychological testimony,
such testimony is not excludible under Rule 403.231 They view the
concern that the jury will be overwhelmed by the expert's qualifica-
tions as an insufficient reason for excluding expert psychological
testimony.23 2 Thus, because expert psychological testimony meets
the admissibility standards and will be critical in certain cases, it
should not be barred under Rule 403 in those cases for causing de-
lay or confusing the jury. Furthermore, a number of lawyers and
judges advocate the use of expert psychologists when identification
disputes arise.2
33
Psychologists argue that the admissibility standards for scien-
tific evidence now permit the introduction of expert psychological
evidence. They assert that lay persons, in contrast to those in the
legal profession, have shown little understanding of the hazards as-
227 Id. at 292-93, 660 P.2d at 1219-20. See also Convis, supra note 1, at 583-84.
228 See Loftus & Fishman, supra note 1, at 102. Loftus argued that Amaral and Brown
could have been decided differently under the Federal Rules. This contention, however,
is clearly untenable in light of the decisions in Fosher and Thevis. See supra notes 130, 158,
164-66 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 147.
230 See Convis, supra note 1, at 583-84; see also FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee
note ("This forum recognizes that experts may also testify with respect to facts which
they have perceived or present dissertations or explanations, leaving the trier of fact to
apply them to the facts." Id.)
231 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
232 See Convis, supra note 1, at 584. Psychologists reason that this concern would be
invalid when opposing parties each offer such evidence. Even if the evidence comes
from only one party, most jurors may consider themselves better amateur psychologists
than amateur physicians or chemists. They are unlikely to be as swayed by psychological
testimony as other forms of expert testimony. A second reason expert psychological
testimony should not be excluded for fear of its persuasive weight is that the usual jury
instructions remind the jury that they are not bound by the expert's testimony and
should give it only the weight that they believe it is due. Id.
233 See McCloskey & Egeth, infra note 240 at 576 ("This negative view [toward the




sociated with eyewitness testimony.234 Their experiments on the
impact that a single eyewitness can have in a courtroom show that
jurors continue to believe that eyewitness testimony is reliable.235
Furthermore, psychologists argue that several factors will ade-
quately limit the circumstances in which expert psychological testi-
mony would be used.236 For example, psychologists agree that
experts should be free to refuse to offer expert psychological testi-
mony in certain cases. 23 7
Finally, some psychologists contend that the legal system is sim-
ply reluctant to allow psychology to enter into the courtroom. 23 8
These psychologists deem that the law's response to psychology to
234 See Buckhout, supra note 15, at 44; Convis, supra note 1, at 583.
235 Loftus argues that in identification cases jurors deliberate without adequate infor-
mation because they are unaware of factors rendering eyewitness testimony unreliable.
Jurors' lack of knowledge in this area is compounded by a tendency to rely heavily on
eyewitness testimony in any form. See Loftus & Fishman, supra note 1, at 88-89 (1978).
The assumption that the jury can adequately evaluate eyewitness testimony under-
lies the broad discretion granted to the trial court to exclude the expert testimony. Lof-
tus argues, however, that jurors lack any collective understanding of eyewitness
behavior. In one study, Loftus presented fourteen questions, each relevant to a juror's
common sense understanding about human behavior in the identification of persons, to
265 total subjects in samples in Washington, Nebraska, and Washington, D.C. The
overall results, while exceeding chance levels, did not show that jurors possess adequate
information about eyewitnesses. Only with respect to two items, the effect of stress on
perception and memory and the effect of leading questions on response accuracy, was
there any real demonstration of a collective understanding amongjurors. Deffenbacher
& Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior, 6 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 15, 24-26 (1982).
In one experiment, 150 subjects were asked to play the role ofjurors trying a crimi-
nal case. They received a written description of a grocery store robbery in which two
people were killed. They also received a summary of the evidence and arguments
presented at the defendant's trial. Fifty jurors were told that several other pieces of
circumstantial evidence were presented against the defendant; only 18%7 of these jurors
found the defendant guilty. Fifty other jurors received these same facts with the addi-
tional information that a store clerk had made an eyewitness identification of the defend-
ant. Out of this qroup, 72% stated that the defendant was guilty. Loftus also maintains
that jurors believe eyewitness testimony more than other types of evidence. In one ex-
periment Loftus compared the impact of eyewitness testimony upon jurors to that of
evidence from polygraph, handwriting, and even fingerprint experts. Convictions were
highest in the case in which simulated jurors heard eyewitness testimony (78%). See
Loftus, Whose Shadow is Crooked?, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 576 (May, 1983).
236 Psychologists argue that in addition to the legal standards for admission of expert
psychological testimony, they have personal criteria that must be met in a particular case
before they will agree to testify. Telephone interview with Dr. Robert Buckhout (Jan. 20,
1984).
Exclusion of expert testimony would be appropriate, for example, where the trial
judge finds that there is no psychological research pertinent to the facts in the case, if
the testimony is only a minor portion of the party's case, or if the unreliability of the
identification is provable by other means. See Loftus & Fishman, supra note 1, at 101.
237 See Loftus, supra note 235, at 576.
238 See Buckhout, supra note 15, at 41.
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be dangerously outdated and find that it would be greatly improved
by the admission of expert psychological testimony in appropriate
cases.
IV. ANALYSIS: SHOULD COURTS ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION?
A. WAS THE COURT WRONG IN STATE V CHAPPLE?
Whether psychological expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony should be admissible is a highly controversial
issue that must be resolved before other courts follow the danger-
ous holding of State v. Chapple.23 9 The analysis of the Arizona
Supreme Court was unsound. Furthermore, the danger associated
with admission of expert psychological testimony240 is an additional
reason to reject any extension of the Chapple result to other cases.
The Chapple holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
precluding expert psychological testimony under the circumstances
of the case was clearly unprecedented. The Chapple court failed to
provide a single reported case upon which it could rely in reaching
its decision.241 The Chlappe majority nonetheless attempted to dis-
tinguish cases excluding expert psychological testimony by arguing
that many of the cases contained fact situations that failed to meet
the Amaral criteria or were decided on legal principles differing from
those followed in Arizona. 242 The Chapple court cited and attempted
to distinguish only two atypical cases, United States v. Watson 243 and
United States v. Brown.
244
The majority opinion in Chapple attempted to justify its holding
by arguing that eyewitness identification was a critical issue in the
case. 245 That distinction, however, provides no support for the
court's conclusion, because identification is often a critical issue in a
239 Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 291, 660 P.2d at 1218.
240 See infra notes 262-269 and accompanying text. See also McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewit-
ness Identification, What Can a Psychologist Tell a Jury?, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 550, 558-59
(May, 1983).
241 While Arizona is not bound by federal precedent or other states' precedent, the
Chapple decision relies extensively on the federal cases and rules in this area. In choos-
ing to do so, the majority opinion does not adequately explain why it failed to reach a
similar result to that reached by the other cases.
242 135 Ariz. at 291, 660 P.2d at 1218.
243 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978).
244 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976). In Watson, for example, the proposed expert testi-
mony was excluded by the court because the proffered expert was not qualified to testify
on the subject. Watson, 587 F.2d at 369. In many cases where the expert witness was
qualified, courts have nevertheless excluded expert psychological testimony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
245 135 Ariz. at 297, 660 P.2d at 1224.
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criminal case. Justice Hays, in his dissenting opinion to Chapple,
agreed that "[t]he fact that identification was defendant Chapple's
sole defense should not compel us to carve out an exception to our
rule against such testimony. '"246
The Chapple court also failed in its attempt to distinguish cases
excluding expert psychological testimony on the basis that those
cases were not decided under the same legal rules as those followed
in Arizona. The Arizona laws governing the admission of expert
testimony are identical to the Federal Rules. If the court had con-
sidered the reasoning of the Fifth and First Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals in United States v. Thevis24 7 and United States v. Fosher,
24 8 it
would have discovered that the introduction of expert psychological
testimony is banned under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.249 In
Fosher, for example, the court held that "the offer. . . was neither
sufficiently focused on the issue nor sufficiently beyond the ken of
lay jurors to satisfy Rule 702."250 Because Arizona Rule of Evidence
702 repeats Federal Rule 702 verbatim, 25' the Chapple court's argu-
ment that the Arizona legal rules led to a different result than under
the Federal Rules is untenable. Similarly, a near majority of the
states have adopted rules of evidence patterned after the federal
model.252 Courts in these states have uniformly rejected appeals
challenging trial courts' denials of expert psychological
testimony.25
3
246 Id. at 300, 660 P.2d at 1227 (Hays, J., dissenting).
247 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982).
248 590 F.2d 381 (lst Cir. 1979).
249 See supra note 147. The Federal Rules of Evidence were intended to expand the
admissibility of expert opinions as outlined in Chapter VII of the Federal Rules. See FED.
R. EviD. 702 advisory committee note. Federal Rule 702, however, has never been inter-
preted by any court to permit psychological expert testimony as proposed in Chapple.
250 Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383.
251 ARIZ. R. oF EVID., 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Id. See also Federal Rule 702, supra note 147. The Chairman of the State Bar of the
Arizona Committee on Rules of Evidence has stated that "It]he Arizona Rules of Evi-
dence are direct descendants of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Kaufman, The Arizona
Rules of Evidence-A Comparison With the Federal Rules, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 365, 365-66.
While the Arizona version of Article VII, like the federal model, expanded the admissi-
bility of expert opinions, such expansion was intended to be kept to a minimum in Ari-
zona. Id. at 366 n.4.
252 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
253 See, e.g., State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Iowa 1980) (court cited MINN.




The Arizona Supreme Court's approach toward the Amaral cri-
teria for the admission of scientific evidence was misguided. The
Chapple court approved the four-part admissibility standard of
Amaral,254 but incorrectly held that the Chapple case met that stan-
dard. The Chapple court may have assumed that the Amaral criteria
were relaxed under the Federal Rules. 255 Other decisions, however,
would not support this theory and suggest that under the proper
application of Amaral, the testimony in Chapple would have been
inadmissible. 25
6
First, the court's consideration of whether the testimony re-
flected a level of knowledge accepted in scientific circles was inade-
quate. 257 The Chapple court neglected to determine whether the
offered testimony reflected theories accepted by other experts in
Loftus' field. Psychological expert testimony was precluded for this
reason in United States v. Fosher258 and more recently in the case of
People v. Brown.259 The holdings in these cases are supported by cur-
rent research indicating that many of psychologists' assertions about
eyewitnesses are unsupported by empirical evidence.260 The effects
of stress on identification, the relation between confidence and ac-
curacy, the operation of the storage interval, and the occurrence of
weapon focus, for example, are theories whose validity is debated
among psychologists. 261
Psychologists favoring expert psychological testimony rely on
studies demonstrating little positive correlation between the vari-
ables of confidence and accuracy in identification.2 62 Early research
in this area, however, reached the opposite conclusion. 263 Further-
254 135 Ariz. at 291, 660 P.2d at 1218.
255 There is little support for Loftus' argument that the Amaral requirements were
relaxed under the Federal Rules. For an explanation of Loftus' position, see Loftus &
Fishman, supra note 1, at 102.
Testimony is no longer objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact. The facts or data underlying the expert opinion, however,
must be of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. See Kaufman, supra note
251, at 376.
256 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
257 135 Ariz. at 291, 660 P.2d at 1218.
258 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
259 117 Misc. 2d 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1983).
260 See McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 240, at 556-58.
261 Id. at 556-57. For retention interval, studies have shown that retention declines as
a function of delay. The data, however, is mixed for full recognition. The authors state
that there is little evidence about how weapon focus affects eyewitness performance. In
fact, "there is virtually no evidence that the phenomenon actually occurs." Id. at 557.
262 See, e.g., Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra note 1, at 440.
263 See Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We InferAnythingAbout Their
Relationship?, 4 LAw & HuM. BEHtav. 243 (1980). The author notes that support for a
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more, a psychologist who recently reviewed 25 studies of the accu-
racy-confidence relation determined that while a confident witness is
generally more accurate in his identification of a suspect, this is true
only when the suspect is observed under optimal viewing condi-
tions.264 Thus, the positive relation between confidence and accu-
racy may not necessarily be invalid but rather highly dependent on
other external influences.
The second and primary inquiry in Chapple was whether the pro-
posed testimony met the Amaral proper subject requirement. The
Chapple court held that scientific evidence will "assist the jury so
long as the untrained layman would be unable 'to the best possible
degree' to determine the issue by himself."265 The Chapple court
ignored, however, the qualification in Fosher that "to be a proper
subject of expert testimony, proof offered . ..must present [the
jurors] with a system of analysis reasonably likely to add to common
understanding of the particular issue before the jury. ' 266 This
statement suggests that expert evidence must add to jurors' com-
mon knowledge to be admissible.
Other courts have held, for example, that unaided jurors are
able to evaluate, without the aid of psychological experts, the signifi-
cance of a long time period between an identification and the ob-
served incident. 267 And in Johnson v. State,268 for example, the
Supreme Court of Florida stated that: "[W]e believe it is within the
common knowledge of the jury that a person being attacked and
beaten undergoes stress that might cloud a subsequent identifica-
tion of the assailant by the victim. As such, the subject matter was
not properly within the realm of expert testimony." 269
Several psychologists are critical of expert psychological testi-
positive confidence-accuracy relation is based on a 20 year tradition of laboratory stud-
ies, "feeling of knowing" studies, and intuition. Id. at 244.
264 Id. Deffenbacher found that the confidence-accuracy relation was reliable only
under ideal information processing conditions. These conditions included an adequate
opportunity for observation in a low stress situation. See also Leippe, Effects of Integrative
Memorial and Cognitive Processes on the Correspondence of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 261, 264-65 (1980).
265 135 Ariz. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220.
266 Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383.
267 See, e.g., State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981) (identification oc-
curred about four and one-half months after robbery); State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d
736 (1979) (identification occurred three years after felony murder). In both cases the
courts held that the expert testimony of a psychologist on the effect that the longer the
period of time between an incident and a witness' recollection may have on the accuracy
of that recollection may properly be excluded.
268 393 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1981).
269 Id. at 1072 (quoting Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
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mony as an aid to juries. 270 The psychologists attack in particular
two rationales supporting the use of expert psychological testimony:
(1) that jurors are unable to distinguish between accurate and inac-
curate witnesses; and (2) that jurors are too willing to believe eye-
witness testimony.27' Many of the variables affecting the accuracy of
an eyewitness identification are presently recognized by jurors.
Variables such as exposure duration, time interval before identifica-
tion, and cross-racial identification, for example, are generally con-
sidered by jurors when evaluating an eyewitness account.
272
Some studies have suggested that jurors cannot always recog-
nize unreliable eyewitness testimony and that expert psychological
testimony would improve their ability to do S0.273 Other studies
also have demonstrated, however, that jurors are significantly influ-
enced by the degree to which the viewing conditions of the particu-
lar witness are favorable. 274 The less favorable the viewing
conditions, the less likely are jurors to believe the witness. Thus,
jurors do consider factors affecting witness accuracy. Because in
Chapple the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the suspect,
jurors could have considered this fact in weighing the witnesses' tes-
timony.275 Furthermore, one study has concluded that while jurors
who receive expert advice become more skeptical of the eyewitness
identifications, they do not experience any improvement in their
ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses.
276
270 See generally McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 240.
271 Id. at 551.
272 Id. at 556-57.
273 Id. at 555 ("The discrimination rationale asserts that regardless of whether jurors
are generally skeptical or generally credulous of eyewitness testimony, they cannot dis-
tinguish well between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses." Id.). See, e.g., Wells, Lind-
say & Ferguson, supra note 1, at 440-48.
Several studies suggest that expert psychological testimony may serve to make ju-
rors more skeptical of eyewitness testimony. See, e.g., Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 65J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1980);
Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 282-85 (1980).
274 See, e.g., Deffenbacher, supra note 263, at 244. Lindsay, Wells & Rumpel, Can People
Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL-
OGY 79 (1981).
275 In Chapple the witnesses spent over one and one-half days with the suspect. 135
Ariz. at 284-85, 660 P.2d at 1211-12.
276 See McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 240, at 555. Only one relevant study has con-
sidered the possible effects of expert psychological testimony on jurors' ability to dis-
criminate accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses. The study, conducted by G.L. Wells
and R.C. Lindsay, used subjects serving as jurors who judged whether or not witnesses
to a staged crime accurately identified the perpetrator. Half of the "jurors" received
expert psychological advice before judging the credibility of witnesses, and the remain-
ing 'jurors" received no expert advice.
The expert testimony emphasized two general points: (1) that eyewitness identifica-
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Cross-examination is the appropriate method to inform jurors
about any weaknesses in eyewitness testimony. The Amaral court
stated that, "[i]t is the responsibility of counsel during cross-exami-
nation to inquire into the witness' opportunity for observation, his
capacity for observation, his attention and interest and his distrac-
tion or division of attention." 277 Justice Hays agreed in his dissent
to Chapple that jurors, without expert assistance, are well-equipped
to evaluate the weight to be given to eyewitness testimony on the
basis of information elicited during cross-examination. 278
The assertion that expert psychological testimony is necessary
because jurors are too willing to believe eyewitness testimony also is
incorrect. The results of one study of jury verdicts in 201 criminal
cases showed that convictions were no more likely in cases involving
identifications of the defendant by a victim or other witness(es) than
in cases where there was no eyewitness identification. 279 Further-
more, juries could become overly skeptical of eyewitness testimony
if psychological experts are allowed to testify. 28 0
The Chapple court gave insufficient treatment to the third part of
the Amaral test; the balancing of probative value and unfair preju-
dice.28 1 Under the Federal Rules, evidence admissible under Rule
702 is excluded under Rule 403 unless its probative value outweighs
its potential for unfair prejudice.28 2 The court in Chapple gave no
explanation of why admission of Loftus' testimony would not have
had the same potential for prejudice.
tion in criminal cases is quite different from recognizing one's friends and associates;
and (2) that there is evidence to show that witness confidence may have little or no
relationship to witness accuracy.
The expert psychological testimony reduced the jurors' overall willingness to be-
lieve eyewitnesses. The expert testimony, however, had absolutely no effect on jurors'
ability to discriminate accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Id. at 556.
277 Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153.
278 ChappLe, 135 Ariz. at 300, 660 P.2d at 1227 (Hays, J., dissenting).
279 See McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 240, at 554. This study examined the 201 crim-
inal cases tried byjury in Marion County, Indiana, betweenJanuary 1974 andJune 1976.
The authors suggest that the claim that jurors rarely regard eyewitness testimony with
any skepticism is doubtful because the ratio of convictions in cases with at least one
eyewitness identification of the defendant to convictions in cases without identification
was almost identical.
A dramatic illustration of this point is provided in one case where a man was ar-
rested 13 times and tried five times in an 18-month period for a series of crimes that
were later confessed to by another man. The suspect was acquitted in all five trials, even
though one or more eyewitnesses testified against him in each. Id. at 554-55.
280 McCloskey and Egeth argue that absent clear evidence that jurors overbelieve eye-
witnesses, jurors may not need to be made more skeptical overall. McCloskey & Egeth,
supra note 240, at 554-55.
281 For a discussion of this criteria see supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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Under Rule 403 evidence should be excluded not only when it
is unfairly prejudicial, but whenever its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger of confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
or by considerations of needless delay and waste of time.28 3 The
Chapple majority, however, failed to address the problems associated
with expert psychological testimony that may result in the above
dangers and considerations.
One of these dangers is that a serious negative inference prob-
lem may result from the admission of expert psychological testi-
mony.28 4 As this testimony is accepted more frequently at trial, its
absence in a particular case might cause a jury to believe that the
eyewitness testimony presented must be highly accurate. The jury
may make a negative inference from the lack of expert psychological
testimony and assume that the eyewitness testimony is reliable.
The administrative costs associated with the admission of ex-
pert psychological testimony would have detrimental effects on the
courtroom process in terms of the time and expense involved.285
The prosecution, for example, may attempt to introduce its own ex-
perts to rebut the expert psychological testimony of the defend-
ant.286 The probative value of the proposed expert testimony is
further decreased by the fact that the number of mistaken convic-
tions based on eyewitness identifications is relatively small. 287 The
harms noted above, inherent in the admissibility rule approved in
Chapple, clearly outweigh any probative value that such expert testi-
mony may possess.
28 8
283 See supra note 174. The Federal Rule appears to be a broader rule on an exclusion
than the prejudicial effect criteria under Amaral.
284 See Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with
the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAUF. L. REv. 1011, 1057-59 (1978).
285 See McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 240, at 558-59.
286 See State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689 (La. 1982). In Chapman, for example, the
trial court allowed the State's psychiatric expert to testify about the witness' reaction to
stress. The testimony contradicted Buckhout's testimony that the perceptual abilities of
a person undergoing stress are decreased. Id. at 705.
287 See McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 240, at 552 ("[D]ocumehted cases of wrongful
conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness testimony obviously represent only a
small fraction of 1% of the cases in which defendants were convicted at least in part on
the basis of eyewitness testimony.").
288 135 Ariz. at 296, 660 P.2d at 1224. The ChappLe court also neglected to set out
guidelines for the admission of expert psychological testimony in cases decided after
Chapple. The majority stated that trial court discretionary rulings will for the most part
continue to be supported. Id. at 297, 660 P.2d at 1224. This author, however, is left
unsatisfied. The current developments in this area favor the admission of such evidence.
Subsequent cases may adopt the Chapple court's questionable ruling unless real guide-
lines are established as to under what circumstances, if any, a trial court must admit
expert psychological evidence.
As pointed out by Justice Hays in his dissenting opinion, "[w]ith little to distinguish
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Thus, the court was wrong in State v. Chapple.289 First, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court ignored applicable authorities in reaching its
decision. Second, the Chapple court misinterpreted the rules gov-
erning the admission of expert scientific evidence. Under even the
most liberal construction of the rules for evaluating the proposed
testimony, expert psychological evidence is inadmissible because of
its questionable value and because it is generally unhelpful to ajury.
Finally, even were the proposed testimony to meet all other require-
ments, expert psychological testimony introduces its own dangers
and prejudices that ordinarily would require its exclusion.
B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADMISSION OF EXPERT
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
This Comment is intended primarily as an evaluation of Ameri-
can courts' current indications of willingness to consider the admis-
sion of expert psychological testimony. Thus, it will consider other
solutions to the problem of unreliable identification only briefly in
order to show that viable alternatives to expert psychological testi-
mony exist. Furthermore, it will suggest other less onerous ways in
which psychologists might contribute to legal proceedings.
The most drastic alternative to admitting expert psychological
testimony is simply to exclude all eyewitness testimony,290 or, to re-
ject the one-witness rule.29 1 Great Britain is considering the latter
reform which would require some corroborating evidence before a
conviction based on eyewitness testimony could stand.292 This ap-
proach, however, may result in over-protecting a defendant at the
expense of society.293
this case from the general rule against admitting eyewitness identification, we are left
with no guidelines to decide the deluge of similar issues which are sure to result." Id. at
300, 660 P.2d at 1227 (Hays, J., dissenting).
289 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
290 See Comment, supra note 8, at 1423-24 ("Complete exclusion of eyewitness identi-
fication testimony, on the ground that its probative value is outweighed by its inherent
unreliability and prejudicial impact, has not been seriously advocated by any modem
commentator.").
291 Id. at 1424.
292 The British home secretary appointed a committee to investigate mistaken identifi-
cation after two persons were independently convicted on the basis of mistaken identifi-
cation. The committee recommended that a trial judge should be required by statute to
direct a jury that it is not safe to convict upon eyewitness evidence unless the circum-
stances of the identification are exceptional or the eyewitness identification is supple-
mented by substantial evidence of another sort. See Williams, Evidence of Identification:
The Devlin Report, 1976 CRIM. L. REV. 407-22.
293 See Woocher, supra note 1, at 100 1-02 n.151. Woocher explains that policy consid-
erations prevent a rejection of the one-witness rule. This solution would allow a guilty
defendant to escape conviction "despite a highly reliable, if uncorroborated, identifica-
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One of the best available alternatives to admitting expert psy-
chological testimony is the use of cautionary jury instructions. This
alternative would require special instructions in criminal cases
where eyewitness identification is significant. In United States v.
Telfaire,2 94 the court articulated "Model Instructions" on eyewitness
identification that have become the standard prototype for such in-
structions. 295 The instructions state that identity is an issue in the
case, that the prosecution has the burden of proving identity beyond
tion." Id. at 1002. Furthermore, determining "what constitutes sufficient corroboration
... is so difficult that this solution is impracticable." See Comment, supra note 8, at
1424 n.198.
294 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
295 In Telfaire the trial court in a robbery case refused to give special instructions on
eyewitness identification. The court of appeals held that the failure to give the instruc-
tions was not prejudicial under the facts of the case; the court, however, adopted model
instructions to be used in future cases. In Telfaire the appeals court found no prejudicial
error where the witness had adequate opportunity to observe and had made a spontane-
ous identification.
The instructions adopted by the Telfaire court provide:
Appendix: Model Special Instructions on Identification
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defend-
ant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of proving
identity beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be
free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, must
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the
defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime, you must
find the defendant not quilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness.
Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the
time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the
following:
(I) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate op-
portunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at
the time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short a time
was available, how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions,
whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the person in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception
through the use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the
sense of sight-but this is not necessarily so, and he may use other senses.]*
[Footnote * Sentence in brackets to be used only if appropriate. Instructions to be
inserted or modified as appropriate to the proof and contentions. Id. at 558]
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent to
the offense was the product of his own recollection? You may take into account
both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which the iden-
tification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circum-
stances under which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you
should scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also consider the
length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next oppor-
tunity of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the
identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the de-
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a reasonable doubt, and that certain factors should be considered in
assessing the identification testimony.296 These factors are identical
to those used by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers.
297
The use of cautionary jury instructions would protect defend-
ants against unreliable eyewitness testimony while imposing mini-
mal costs on society and on the courts. 298 In comparison to expert
psychological testimony, cautionary jury instructions create little
danger of prejudice.299 Critics of this reform suggest that the in-
structions do not provide the jury with enough information to evalu-
ate the eyewitness testimony, that the instructions favor the
defendant, and that juries do not listen to or understand the
instructions.30
0
At present the Telfaire-type instructions seem to offer a work-
able compromise between excluding eyewitness testimony alto-
gether and admitting expert psychological testimony. The
advantage of this alternative lies in its minimal interference with the
function of the jury.30 ' Few courts have held that a refusal to give
fendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one
which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness].
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to
make an identification of defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent
with his identification at trial].
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in
the same way as any other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider
whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the
matter covered in his testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every
element of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime with which he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defend-
ant not guilty. Id. at 558-59.
296 These factors include:
"(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the defendant at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior descrip-
tion of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation."
State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 390, 635 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1981) (quoting Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 98, 199 (1972)).
297 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. In Warren, the court noted that trial
courts must often determine the admissibility of eyewitness testimony; it thus was appro-
priate to require the jury to consider the same factors in weighing the credibility of the
eyewitness identification testimony. Warren, 230 Kan. at 397, 635 P.2d at 1244.
In Telfaire, Judge Bazelon also would have instructed the jury to consider whether
the inter-racial character of an identification affected its reliability. 469 F.2d at 559-60
(Bazelon, J., concurring).
298 See Warren, 230 Kan. at 397, 635 P.2d at 1244.
299 See Comment, supra note 8, at 1426.
300 Id. See also Warren, 230 Kan. at 400, 635 P.2d at 1246 (Fromme, J., dissenting)
(instructions may stack the deck against the government).
301 Advocates of cautionary jury instructions state that, unlike expert psychological
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the requested instructions constitutes reversible error. A number of
courts, however, have found special instructions to present a viable
alternative to the problem of unreliable eyewitness testimony.302
Finally, there are several existing safeguards designed to pre-
vent inaccurate witness identifications. If these protections are ef-
fective, then the rationale for expert psychological testimony is
undermined. For example, trial courts may suppress identification
testimony if the identification procedures rendered the evidence un-
reliable.303 Effective cross-examination and argument by defense
counsel reduce the likelihood that the jury will accept eyewitness
testimony unquestionably.3 04 These safeguards demonstrate that
the legal system is aware of the problems of eyewitness testimony
and has taken steps to combat those problems.
Although expert psychological testimony should be inadmis-
sible, law and psychology could benefit mutually from a closer asso-
ciation. Psychologists should continue to explore the relation
between psychological variables and eyewitness accuracy. Courts
then should use these findings to re-evaluate the factors used to de-
termine the admissibility of eyewitness testimony.
Psychological research has indicated that several of the factors
used to determine reliability under Brathwaite could be improved.30 5
In terms of the "opportunity to observe" factor, psychological evi-
dence is consistent with the assumption that optimal viewing condi-
tions result in more accurate identifications. 306 The "degree of
attention" factor may be valid in some instances, but not in
others.30 7 Little consensus exists over whether the other factors
testimony, the jury will not be overwhelmed by an "expert" with scientific knowledge.
At the same time, the instructions are unlikely to make the jury overskeptical. See Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 1426.
302 See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hodges, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.
1971); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bow-
den, 379 Mass. 972, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980). See also United States v. Anderson, 739 F.2d
1254 (7th Cir. 1984) (pattern instruction on witness identification "substantial
equivalent of Telfaire instruction.").
303 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); see also supra notes 59-71 and accom-
panying text.
304 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1981) (cross-examination in front of
the jury is adequate to test the reliability of eyewitness testimony); see also Convis, supra
note 1, at 580. Courts traditionally have depended upon the cross-examination of iden-
tifying witnesses and on the final argument of defense counsel to suggest to the jury any
weakness in the identification testimony. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
114 (1977).
305 See, e.g., Uelman, Testing the Assumptions of Neil v. Biggers: An Experiment in Eyewit-
ness Identification, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 358 (1980).
306 Id. at 363-65.
307 Id. at 362. Contrary to popular belief, a witness' "degree of attention" is not im-
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used by courts for purposes of admission of eyewitness testimony
are highly accurate indicators of reliability.
The use of certain factors to determine admissibility and to
evaluate reliability in special jury instructions could be improved in
two ways. One idea is to weigh the factors differently; 308 the other is
to focus more specifically on individual variables, such as sex or age,
that research indicates may be related to identification accuracy.30 9
V. CONCLUSION
Expert psychological testimony should not be admissible to
support a theory of mistaken identification. This type of expert evi-
dence fails to meet three of the criteria for the admission of expert
scientific evidence: (1) the subject matter of the testimony is not
outside the average juror's knowledge; (2) research on psychologi-
cal factors affecting eyewitness accuracy is not sufficiently estab-
lished; and (3) substantial problems of prejudice are raised by the
expert psychologist's appearance in the courtroom.
At present, the perceived benefits of psychological testimony
on eyewitness identification do not justify its acceptance by the legal
system. The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Chapple31° recently
disregarded the majority rule excluding expert psychological testi-
mony without providing a sufficient rationale for its decision. The
Chapple case should not be followed for the above reasons and for
the threat it imposes on the integrity of the jury system.
Much eyewitness testimony is neither unreliable nor wrong.
Furthermore, it is the jury's traditional role to determine the weight
and credibility to be given to the evidence presented. In the recent
words of the Supreme Court, "the proper evaluation of evidence
. . .is the very task our system must assume juries can perform." 31'1
Thus, experts whose testimony adds little or nothing to jurors'
ability to determine issues in a given case should be excluded. The
proved because he or she is a police officer or has received special training. Psychologi-
cal research suggests that individual factors such as sex, age, intelligence, and race are
the more significant factors in the accuracy of human perception. Id.
308 Studies suggest that the "opportunity to observe" factor may be the most relevant
among the factors currently used in determining identification accuracy. Id. at 363. See
also Convis, supra note 1, at 590-91.
309 See Uelman, supra note 79, at 363. Uelman found that "the most significant varia-
ble revealed by this experiment was sexual difference between the witness and the sus-
pect." Id. at 365. Generally, the effects of age and sex on eyewitness accuracy are not
well understood. Children are considered the most inaccurate witnesses. See E. LOF-
Tus, supra note 1, at 162. For a contrary opinion, see Perception-Can Child Eyewitnesses Be
Trusted, 13 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 3 (1979).
310 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
311 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981).
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value of expert psychological testimony must be weighed against the
competing factors and caselaw discussed in this Comment. The
consequences of the result reached in Chapple will be more damag-
ing to our legal system than any problems associated with eyewit-
ness testimony.
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